TOP 10 Countries by Budget Deficit as % of GDP (2025)

Table 1. Countries with the largest budget deficits, 2025 (% of GDP)

Ranked by the most negative value of the IMF WEO indicator for the year 2025. All ten countries have a balance below −10 % of GDP — far beyond the commonly cited −3 % threshold.

Source: IMF DataMapper, WEO October 2025 edition, indicator GGXCNL_NGDP. Values rounded to one decimal. Negative = deficit (net borrowing). Sign convention: reading −12.4 % as "a 12.4 % deficit of GDP" is correct.

Chart 1. Budget deficit — Top 10 countries vs. world aggregate, 2025 (% of GDP)

The bar chart below shows each country's general government balance as a percentage of GDP. The orange reference line marks the IMF world aggregate of −5.2 % for 2025. All ten countries fall well beyond this line.

Horizontal axis: balance in % of GDP (negative values = deficit). The dashed line is the world aggregate reference (−5.2 %). Source: IMF WEO October 2025.

Table 2. General government balance: 2019 vs. 2020 vs. 2025 (% of GDP)

The table compares fiscal positions before the COVID shock (2019), during the peak-spending year (2020), and in the 2025 forecast. In general, deficits widened sharply in 2020 and then partially narrowed by 2025 — but the speed and depth of consolidation differs considerably across countries.

Source: IMF DataMapper, WEO October 2025. Sign convention: negative = deficit. "Change 2019→2025" is the arithmetic difference; a negative change means the deficit widened (or a surplus narrowed) over the period.

Chart 2. General government balance, 2010–2025: selected large economies (% of GDP)

These paths show the same IMF WEO net lending/borrowing indicator across a 15-year horizon for the United States, China, Japan, Germany, and the world aggregate. The 2020 dip from COVID-19 fiscal responses is visible in all series, followed by partial consolidation. Germany stands out for running surpluses in the late 2010s before returning to negative territory.

Vertical axis: % of GDP (negative = deficit). Dashed line = world aggregate. Source: IMF WEO October 2025. Values are rounded and serve analytical illustration, not as a formal statistical release.

Methodology

What is being measured

The ranking is built on the IMF indicator General government net lending (+) / net borrowing (−) as a percent of nominal GDP, identifier GGXCNL_NGDP in the IMF DataMapper. "General government" consolidates central government, state and local governments, and social security funds. This is more internationally comparable than a central-government cash balance alone.

Data source and vintage

All figures are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2025 edition. The 2025 column represents IMF staff projections, not yet finalized outturns. Values for 2019 and 2020 in Table 2 are also from the same edition (they may differ slightly from historical actuals in prior WEO vintages due to methodological revisions).

Ranking logic

Countries are ranked from the most negative to the least negative value for the year 2025. Economies with missing or non-comparable IMF data are excluded. Values are rounded to one decimal place.

Limitations

• Small-economy effect: Very small economies can show extremely large deficit-to-GDP ratios because a single investment program, external grant, or revenue swing shifts the ratio by double-digit percentage points. Direct comparison with large diversified economies is misleading.
• Coverage differences: Some countries use cash accounting; others use accrual. Fiscal year definitions also differ (calendar year vs. April–March etc.).
• Off-budget items: State-owned enterprise losses, contingent liabilities, and quasi-fiscal operations may not be captured in the headline balance.
• Revision risk: WEO projections are updated twice a year. The 2025 forecast may change materially with subsequent editions.

Key insights from the 2025 ranking

The 2025 list reflects two distinct fiscal stress profiles

Looking across the ten entries, two patterns emerge. The first group — Ukraine, Bolivia, Egypt, Algeria, Malawi, and Kiribati — carries structurally weak fiscal positions driven by limited revenue bases, commodity dependence, or external shocks. Ukraine's deficit of −21.3 % of GDP in 2025 directly reflects the enormous fiscal cost of war, financed heavily through international donor support. Without that external financing, the fiscal situation would be unsustainable under any conventional assessment.

The second group — Timor-Leste, Brunei Darussalam, Bahrain, and Saint Kitts and Nevis — looks different. These are relatively small, and in several cases resource-dependent, economies where the ratio is amplified by a small GDP denominator or by a sharp cyclical fall in hydrocarbon revenues. Brunei ran a deficit of −15.8 % in 2020 when oil prices collapsed and is now partially consolidating. Bahrain has been on a fiscal adjustment path since its 2018 GCC financial support program but still carries a large structural deficit.

Timor-Leste is an outlier even within this group

At −50.4 % of GDP, Timor-Leste sits far above the rest of the ranking. The country's fiscal position is dominated by withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund, a sovereign wealth fund that accumulates hydrocarbon revenues. When the government draws down on the fund to finance public services and infrastructure, this appears as a fiscal deficit in the WEO measure — even though the underlying net wealth position may not deteriorate at the same pace. Treating Timor-Leste's deficit as directly comparable to that of Ukraine or Egypt overstates the fiscal risk.

The pre-COVID baseline matters

A comparison with 2019 reveals that several countries on this list were already in a structurally weak fiscal position well before the pandemic. Egypt ran a −7.6 % deficit in 2019; Algeria −8.5 %; Bolivia −7.2 %. For these economies, 2025 deficits represent a continuation and worsening of existing pressures, not a temporary pandemic-era anomaly. By contrast, Ukraine had a deficit of only −2.1 % in 2019 before the full-scale invasion transformed the fiscal landscape.

High income does not mean low deficit

Three of the Top 10 — Saint Kitts and Nevis, Brunei Darussalam, and Bahrain — are classified as high-income economies, demonstrating that large headline deficits are not exclusive to lower-income countries. The common thread is commodity revenue volatility or structural expenditure commitments that outpace revenue growth. Bahrain, for example, carries a debt burden that requires careful management despite its Gulf Cooperation Council support agreements.

Large advanced economies: a different tier of concern

The line chart (Chart 2) contextualises the Top 10 within a broader picture. The United States is projected at approximately −7.4 % of GDP in 2025, and China at −8.6 % — figures that would easily qualify for the Top 10 by magnitude. They are absent from the ranking only because the Top 10 focuses on the most extreme negative values in the full WEO dataset and both sit just outside that threshold. Their sheer size means that even moderate deficit-to-GDP ratios translate into trillions of dollars in absolute borrowing. Japan's deficit of around −3.3 % reflects ongoing fiscal consolidation, while Germany has returned to a modest deficit after years of surpluses.

What this means for readers

Deficit-to-GDP is a fast "temperature check" for public finances, but it becomes genuinely informative only when placed in context. Before drawing conclusions from this ranking, consider these four dimensions:

• Debt level: A large deficit is more alarming if public debt is already high. A country at 20 % of GDP debt that runs a −10 % deficit has more fiscal space than one at 120 % of GDP with the same deficit.
• Interest-to-revenue burden: If interest payments consume a large share of government revenues, the capacity to adjust is limited and the debt spiral risk is real. Egypt, for example, devotes a very high share of revenues to debt servicing.
• Growth rate: A −6 % deficit is more manageable in an economy growing at 6 % in nominal terms than in one that is stagnant, because growth stabilises the debt-to-GDP ratio.
• Financing structure: Deficits funded in local currency by domestic investors carry different risks from deficits financed externally in foreign currency. The latter creates exchange rate and refinancing vulnerability.

A single year with a large deficit is not automatically a crisis. What matters is whether deficits persist over time and whether the government can finance them at sustainable rates without crowding out private credit or forcing inflationary monetary finance. Ukraine's deficit is largely grant-financed by allies, which changes the risk profile substantially. Timor-Leste's is financed by a sovereign wealth fund draw-down. Neither follows the typical debt-accumulation path that triggers market stress.

FAQ

Sources

All figures in the tables and charts are sourced from the following international databases. They are rounded and harmonised for analytical comparability; for formal work, refer to the original databases and methodological documentation.

Cross-country comparability can be affected by fiscal year definitions, accounting standards (cash vs. accrual), coverage differences, and off-budget entities. Always consult the sources above for the latest revisions and indicator definitions.